

THE FREEDOM OF THE GREEKS OF ASIA: FROM ALEXANDER TO ANTIOCHUS*

In an earlier paper Christopher Tuplin and I attempted to establish the date and circumstances of the emergence of the concept of 'the Greeks of Asia' and the consequent appearance of 'the freedom of the Greeks of Asia' as a political slogan.¹ It was there suggested that concept and slogan first crystallized shortly before the Peace of Antalcidas, and that the freedom of the Greeks of Asia first acquired its full force as a catchword when that freedom had been signed away, apparently for ever. The present paper traces the further history of the slogan, first under Alexander and the Diadochi, then at the time of the Roman conquest of the eastern Mediterranean. No attempt is, however, made to deal with every unanswered question raised by either Macedonian or Roman dealings with Greece.

The Greeks of Asia languished under Persia till the time of the Macedonian invasion.² Yet when that invasion came, the freedom of the Greeks of Asia was to play little part in Macedonian propaganda, still less in Macedonian practice. The expedition was conceived by Philip as an act of revenge for the Persian invasions of Greece.³ This theme of revenge was taken up by Alexander at the time of his appointment to command, and recurs in his letter to Darius and his words to Parmenio after the taking of Persepolis.⁴ The even broader theme of a crusade of Greeks against Persians to achieve the conquest of Asia is still more frequent.⁵ It dictates the sedulous manufacture of parallels with the Trojan war and the inscription on the spoils sent to Athens after the battle of the Granicus; it was also used to justify Alexander's hatred of Greeks who fought on the Persian side.⁶

By comparison with these motifs the freedom of the Greeks of Asia receives little attention. When Philip sent out his advance expedition under Parmenio and Attalus, his instructions to them were to free the Greek cities.⁷ But just how flexibly that order could be interpreted is shown by Parmenio's treatment of Grynium.⁸ Alexander too showed himself ruthlessly pragmatic in his attitude to Greek cities, until the appointment of Alcimachus to liberate the Aeolian and Ionian cities.⁹ Yet this development receives little attention in the sources, and the only trace of it in subsequent propaganda is the claim ascribed to Alexander when he was on his way from Miletus to Caria that he had undertaken the war for the sake of the freedom of the Greeks, the only occasion in the surviving evidence on which Alexander makes this assertion.¹⁰

* I am grateful to Professor F. W. Walbank for his comments on a draft of this paper; he should not, however, be assumed to agree with all the views expressed.

¹ *JHS* 100 (1980), pp. 141–54.

² For the Greek cities of Asia in the satraps' revolt, cf. Diod. 15. 90. 3. On Artaxerxes' Egyptian expedition of 351/0, contrast Diod. 16. 46. 4 (the Greek cities of Asia) with the greater precision of 16. 44. 4 (the Greeks who inhabited the coast of Asia).

³ Diod. 16. 89. 2.

⁴ Diod. 17. 4. 9, Arr. 2. 14. 4, 3. 18. 2.

⁵ Arr. 3. 22. 2, 4. 11. 7 f.

⁶ Arr. 1. 11, 1. 16. 7, 1. 29. 6, Diod. 17. 17. 1 ff., Plut. *Alex.* 15 ff.; Arr. 2. 7. 4, 3. 23. 8.

⁷ Diod. 16. 91. 2; cf. 16. 1. 5: Philip cut off in the act of liberating the Greek cities of Asia. Cf. the encouragement of Isocrates (5. 123).

⁸ Diod. 17. 7. 9. Cf. E. Badian, *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford, 1966), pp. 39 f.

⁹ Arr. 1. 17–19; Alcimachus' mission: 1. 18. 1 f. Cf. Badian, *op. cit.* pp. 43 ff.

¹⁰ Diod. 17. 24. 1.

One is compelled to ask, why so little? Various answers suggest themselves. First, the relatively limited theme of the freedom of the Greeks of Asia will have tended to be obliterated by the much broader and more grandiose notion of the great Hellenic crusade against Persia. Secondly, Alexander's actual treatment of individual Greek cities in Asia Minor will often have made the slogan two-edged at best, at worst blatantly inapplicable. Thirdly, unlike the Spartans in the early years of the century, Alexander could not claim to have freed Greece proper from anyone. Yet it was difficult to think about the freedom of the Greeks of Asia in isolation from the freedom of the Greeks as a whole, and that made the subject still more delicate, for the liberation of Greece – from Alexander – was the slogan of the revolt of Thebes.¹¹

In the wars of the Diadochi the Greeks of Asia again receive little mention. But certain fundamental themes emerge, where the freedom of the Greeks in general is concerned, which become increasingly relevant to the Greeks of Asia with the advent of Rome. First, the naked self-interest which invariably inspired the professed concern of the Macedonian princes for the freedom of the Greeks, a concern designed to diminish the influence of opponents and to increase support for themselves.¹² Secondly, the manner in which the Greeks learned to exploit the slogan to further their own interests.¹³ When the Greeks of Asia do appear, they fit well into the general pattern. In 313 Asander, Cassander's general in Caria, promised to leave the Greek cities autonomous and then tried to go back on the agreement, so Antigonos sent a force to liberate the cities. However, the net result of the operations of Antigonos and his generals is summed up by Diodorus in these words: 'thus the cities of Caria became subject to Antigonos'.¹⁴ When the Greeks of Asia were specifically mentioned in an agreement, that between Demetrius and Cassander in 302,¹⁵ there was again a specific practical motive, to save Demetrius' face and give him a fair pretext for withdrawing from Greece. On arriving in Asia he captured and garrisoned Ephesus, and recovered Lampsacus, Parium and other cities. That he liberated any of these is not recorded.

Thus although it is undoubtedly true that the Romans had realized the virtues of *libertas* as a slogan and an administrative convenience before they ever became involved with Greece, and that Flamininus did not need to consult the examples of Polyperchon and Antigonos in order to learn how to exploit it, it is equally true that by this time certain expectations and suspicions had become ingrained in the Greeks through their experience in the Hellenistic period, and that they too were well aware of ways in which the theme of their liberation from one foreign power by another could be turned to their own advantage.

The question remains: when and in what circumstances did Rome first commit

¹¹ Arr. 1. 7. 2, Diod. 17. 9. 5, Plut. *Alex.* 11.

¹² Thus Polyperchon in 319 (Diod. 18. 55 f., cf. 69); Antigonos and Ptolemy in 315 (Diod. 19. 61 f., cf. 64, 66); Antigonos in 313 (Diod. 19. 74 f., 77 f.); the peace of 311 (Diod. 19. 105) with Antigonos' subsequent letter to the Greeks (*Staatsverträge* iii. 428); Ptolemy in 310 (Diod. 20. 19) and 308 (Diod. 20. 37); Demetrius Poliorcetes in 308 (Suda s.v. *Δημήτριος*), 307 (Diod. 20. 45 f.) and 304 (Diod. 20. 100, 102). On Antigonos and Ptolemy, cf. R. H. Simpson (*JHS* 74 (1954), 28 ff.); on the peace of 311, cf. H. Beaumont (*Historia* 13 (1964), 86 ff.).

¹³ Note Athenian pressure on Polyperchon and Nicanor in 318 to honour Polyperchon's decree of the previous year (Diod. 18. 64 ff.) and that brought by Athens, 'the other Greeks' and the Aetolians on Demetrius at Rhodes (Diod. 20. 98 f.). The terms of Demetrius' agreement with the Rhodians, that they should be autonomous, receive no garrison and pay no tribute, make it highly likely that the envoys urged Antigonos' commitment to the freedom of the Greeks.

¹⁴ Diod. 19. 75.

¹⁵ Diod. 20. 111. 2: τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐλευθέρας ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν.

herself to the freedom of the Greeks? That the process was gradual seems clear:¹⁶ the Roman terms delivered to Nicanor from Athens in 200 demanded merely that Philip should make war on none of the Greeks, and the same injunction was repeated by Aemilius to Philip at Abydos.¹⁷ Difficulty first arises over the negotiations between Flamininus and Philip at the Aous in 198. In Livy Flamininus demands only the withdrawal of Macedonian garrisons and the payment of reparations. But in reply to the first point Philip draws a distinction between cities held by right of conquest and cities held by hereditary right, and offers to liberate the former. Then, after a clash over the question of reparations, the matter of which cities should be liberated is raised, and Flamininus names the Thessalians. At this Philip loses his temper and storms out.¹⁸ Diodorus, however, has a different version of the first clause of Flamininus' terms: that Philip should evacuate all Greece (or abandon all claim to Greece),¹⁹ leaving it ungarrisoned and autonomous, and makes Flamininus add to his reply to Philip that he has orders from the senate to liberate the whole of Greece, not merely a part. It is this that in Diodorus' account provokes Philip's loss of temper.²⁰

If Diodorus and Livy merely present different selections of material from a Polybian original, then Flamininus at the Aous was the first Roman in the field to exploit the notion of the freedom of the Greeks and did so on instructions from the senate. But if Livy accurately represents Polybius while Diodorus is contaminated by additions from a later source, Flamininus spoke only of withdrawing garrisons and it was Philip who first broadened the basis of discussion, thus rashly putting a powerful weapon into the hands of Rome and the Greeks. Certainty is impossible, but two considerations favour the latter alternative. First, the freedom of the Greeks does not appear as a slogan in the detailed Polybian accounts of negotiations in the following year at Nicaea and Thronium. It would be somewhat surprising if it had been exploited at the Aous, only to be abandoned. Secondly, it is easier to understand why the elements peculiar to Diodorus should have been added to the tradition as contributions to the hagiography of Flamininus and to the eventual establishment of the Roman claim to have been fighting all along solely for the sake of the Greeks, which made both Flamininus and the senate eager to backdate their adhesion to the cause of Greek freedom, than to discover a reason why Livy, who criticized Attalus and the Rhodians for leaving to Rome the *egregius titulus* of liberators of Greece,²¹ should have omitted an early appeal to the slogan by Rome, if that appeal stood in Polybius.

The possibility that it did not reveals the true importance of early Greek attempts to bring into being such a Roman commitment to Greek freedom. The first hint comes as early as 200, when the Macedonian envoy to the Aetolians issued a reminder that Rome's intervention in Sicily had led to the enslavement of the Greek cities there and the provincialization of the island.²² This was surely intended as a warning not to risk signing up the Romans as liberators of Greece, in case that notion had already entered Greek minds. More important, if Rome did not commit herself to the freedom of the Greeks at the Aous, is the welcome offered by Aristaenus to the Roman presence in

¹⁶ cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (264–70 B.C.) (Oxford, 1958), pp. 67 ff., against earlier exaggerated views.

¹⁷ Pol. 16. 27. 2, 34. 3.

¹⁸ Liv. 32. 10. 3 ff.

¹⁹ On the meaning of ἐκχωρεῖν, cf. M. Holleaux, *Etudes d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* (Paris, 1957), v. 213 ff.

²⁰ Diod. 28. 11: μὴ μέρος τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἐλευθεροῦν. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 71 ff., denies the appearance of the freedom of the Greeks at this stage, but does not deal with the evidence of Diodorus, which is accepted by Holleaux, *Etudes* v. 36; cf. F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 152.

²¹ Liv. 31. 15. 10.

²² Liv. 31. 29. 6 f.

Greece, because it would bring the Achaeans freedom without any effort on their own part, which emerges as a calculated attempt to influence Roman policy.²³ The mounting tide of Greek pressure becomes clearer in 197 in the course of the complicated haggling at Nicaea and Thronium,²⁴ and above all when the Greek envoys go to Rome. According to Polybius the envoys all stressed that as long as Macedon held the Fetters of Greece it would be impossible for the Greeks to secure their freedom.²⁵ The extent to which the Greeks were consciously exploiting the slogan and the cunning with which they applied it are manifest in Polybius' description of the envoys' concluding appeal to the senate not to disappoint the Greeks in their hope of freedom and so miss the chance of winning great renown.²⁶ Yet the senate's question to Philip's envoys stuck to the practical – would he evacuate the Fetters? – saying nothing of the freedom of Greece, and it was on the practical issue that the talks broke down.²⁷

The long-term hopes and fears of the Greeks are even plainer in the discussions after the battle of Cynoscephalae.²⁸ That the freedom of the Greeks is the object of the war is taken for granted – by the Greeks – and variously exploited. The Aetolians, eager to create a power vacuum which they would then be able to fill, warned Flamininus that peace and the freedom of Greece would never be secure unless Philip were put to death or at least deposed, only to see their shaft elegantly turned by the Roman, who expressed a fear that the vacuum thus created might be filled by Thracians, Illyrians or Gauls! Even more illuminating is the plea of Amyntander for a peace that would enable Rome to evacuate Greece without endangering Greek freedom.²⁹ It appears that not only the freedom of Greece but also the commitment to ultimate evacuation were not the product of Flamininus' own initiative but a response on his part and the senate's to Greek pressures and expectations. Certainly the first indisputable Roman commitment to the slogan 'the freedom of Greece' comes not from the mouth of Flamininus but in the terms of reference of the senatorial commission. The commission was instructed to establish the freedom of the Greeks, though the question of the Fetters was left by the senate to the commissioners' discretion.³⁰

It is in the terms produced by the commission that the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks of Asia, as well as those of Europe, first appear, though those cities held by Philip were to be evacuated and handed over to the Romans before the Isthmia.³¹ Roman interest in the Greeks of Asia may also have been at least in part a response to Greek pressure. The first mention of specific Greek cities in Asia had been made by the Rhodians at Nicaea,³² and the potential relevance of the freedom of the Asiatic Greeks to the attempt to contain Antiochus was brought to Rome's attention after Cynoscephalae, if she needed the hint, by the appeal of Lampsacus, Smyrna and perhaps Alexandria Troas for protection.³³ But too much weight need not be assigned to Antiochus' later efforts to suggest that his war with Rome had arisen on account

²³ Liv. 32. 21. 36: 'sine uestro labore et periculo qui uos in libertatem uindicarent'.

²⁴ Pol. 18. 1–11, Liv. 32. 33–7, Plut. *Flam.* 5, App. *Mac.* 8.

²⁵ Pol. 18. 11. 4, a point which particularly impressed the senate (Liv. 32. 37. 3).

²⁶ Pol. 18. 11. 11.

²⁷ Pol. 18. 11. 13.

²⁸ Pol. 18. 36–9, Liv. 33. 12 f.

²⁹ Liv. 33. 12. 2.

³⁰ Pol. 18. 42. 5, Liv. 33. 31. 4 ff.

³¹ Pol. 18. 44. 2 f., garbled or perhaps deliberately misrepresented by Liv. 33. 30. 2 (cf. J. Briscoe *ad loc.*). In general, cf. Walbank, *Philip V*, p. 179, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 72 f.

³² Pol. 18. 2. 3 f., Liv. 32. 33. 6 f.

³³ Pol. 21. 13. 3, App. *Syr.* 2. 5, Diod. 29. 7, *SIG*³ 591. Cf. Holleaux, *Etudes* v. 365, E. Bickermann (*Philol.* 87 (1932), 277 ff.).

of these cities.³⁴ It is reasonable to suppose that, once both Flamininus and the senate had decided to pose as the champions of Greek freedom, the possibility of broadening this stance to include the Greeks of Asia would immediately become obvious to them without any prompting, though it is also true that, once Rome had committed herself to the freedom of mainland Greece, this would greatly encourage Greeks in Asia to try to persuade her to widen her horizons, with the same emotional logic as they had once brought to bear on Sparta.

That Rome's concern was not limited to those of the Asiatic Greeks who had been under Macedonian control is indicated by the commission's instructions to Flamininus to write to Prusias concerning the liberation of Cius.³⁵ The Romans were already preparing the ground for a propaganda campaign designed to check the advance of Antiochus.³⁶ Fear of Antiochus had made the commission reluctant to leave the Fetters ungarrisoned,³⁷ but at Corinth Flamininus emerged for the first time as the champion of the Greek interpretation of the Roman intervention, claiming that only total evacuation would convince the Greeks that Rome had from the first been concerned not for her own advantage but only for the freedom of Greece.³⁸ His motives were both private and public. He was quite as well aware as any Hellenistic monarch of the personal glory to be gained from posing with conviction as the liberator of Greece, and he calculated that this policy would silence the Aetolians, who had already impugned the promised freedom as a sham.³⁹ But for the moment he was prepared, because of the threat from Antiochus, to put Roman garrisons into Acrocorinth, Demetrias and Chalcis.⁴⁰ The proclamation at the Isthmia was for the sake of Rome's – and Flamininus' – public image: it marked no development in policy.⁴¹ But the proclamation, like the peace, spoke of the Greeks of Asia,⁴² and their relevance was promptly made clear in the commissioners' instructions to Antiochus' envoys.⁴³ The value of the slogan is never plainer: the particular practical requirements, that Antiochus should keep his hands off the free cities of Asia and withdraw from those he had taken from Ptolemy or Philip, are immaculately deduced from the general principle that all Greek cities everywhere are henceforth to be free.

But Antiochus, quite apart from his military objectives, was determined to win the propaganda war as well. Even before the talks at Lysimachia he declared to Smyrna and Lampsacus that they would get what they wanted soon enough, once it was clear that their freedom was a gift from him and they had not seized it by force.⁴⁴ So he prepared the ground for his offer at Lysimachia in the same year,⁴⁵ when, after making fools of the Romans at every turn, he magnanimously volunteered to concede their freedom to the Greek cities of Asia, provided it was acknowledged that they owed it to his grace and favour and not to a Roman ultimatum.⁴⁶ This and the revelation

³⁴ Pol. 21. 13. 3.

³⁵ Pol. 18. 44. 5, Liv. 33. 30. 4.

³⁶ cf. Holleaux, *Études* v. 362, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 72 f. The Rhodians had already warned Antiochus that they would not allow him to interfere with the Roman liberation of Greece from Philip (Liv. 33. 20. 3, 11 f.).

³⁷ Liv. 33. 30. 4 ff.

³⁸ Pol. 18. 45. 9 ff., Liv. 33. 31. 8 ff., Plut. *Flam.* 10. On Flamininus, cf. especially Badian, *Titus Quinctius Flamininus* (Cincinnati, 1970), with discussion of other views.

³⁹ Pol. 18. 45. 3 ff., Liv. 33. 31. 2 f.

⁴⁰ Pol. 18. 45. 12, Liv. 33. 31. 11.

⁴¹ Pol. 18. 46, Liv. 33. 32 f., Diod. 28. 13, Plut. *Flam.* 10 ff., App. *Mac.* 9. Cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 73 f.

⁴² Pol. 18. 46. 15, Liv. 33. 33. 7.

⁴³ Pol. 18. 47. 1 f., Liv. 33. 34. 3 f.

⁴⁴ Liv. 33. 38. 5 ff.

⁴⁵ Pol. 18. 50–2, Liv. 33. 39–41, App. *Syr.* 3, Diod. 28. 12. Cf. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 119 ff.

⁴⁶ Pol. 18. 51. 9: τὰς δ' αὐτονόμους τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πόλεων οὐ διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπιταγῆς δεόν εἶναι τυγχάνειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ χάριτος.

of his marriage alliance with Ptolemy at once reaffirmed his own claim to be the sole ruler of Asia and denied the Romans all pretext for armed intervention.

The Greeks of Asia now faded into the background for a time, while Nabis occupied the centre of the stage.⁴⁷ In Flamininus' dealings with the Spartan king policy and propaganda sharply diverged, and when policy was allowed to triumph it provoked misgivings and angry criticism. The leaving of Nabis in power was deemed unfitting for the self-styled liberator of Greece.⁴⁸ But Flamininus handled the situation well. His excuses about Nabis were no more convincing than they had been a year before, but he moved from them directly to the long-delayed announcement that Rome was to evacuate the Fetters.⁴⁹ In the emotional response to this announcement Nabis was, as Flamininus had no doubt reckoned, forgotten for the moment.

The subordination of propaganda to policy was even more marked when the question of the Greeks of Asia was reopened by the visit of Antiochus' envoys to Rome later in 194.⁵⁰ In secret session Flamininus made it clear that if Antiochus would undertake to keep out of Europe, Rome would conveniently forget all about her avowed interest in the freedom of the Greeks of Asia; otherwise, she would feel free to pursue it.⁵¹ When Hegesianax objected that Antiochus' honour was at stake in Thrace, Flamininus cynically pointed out that Rome's honour too was at stake in Asia, and that the Roman point of honour would have much better publicity value than the king's, a point which Hegesianax was forced to concede.⁵² With Flamininus' warning that Rome had it in mind not to abandon her patronage of Greek freedom but to liberate the Greek cities of Asia from Antiochus just as she had liberated Greece proper from Philip, the meeting came to an end.⁵³ Next day, according to Livy and Diodorus, Flamininus announced in open session to the envoys of the Greeks precisely what he had said to Hegesianax in private, that unless Antiochus withdrew from Europe, Rome would fight for the freedom of the Greeks of Asia.⁵⁴ The Greeks are said to have applauded, but that they would have welcomed such a flagrant betrayal of Rome's commitment is inconceivable. Fortunately the truth is preserved by Appian, who reports that Flamininus promised the king Roman friendship if he left the Greeks of Asia autonomous and withdrew from Europe.⁵⁵ After such dishonesty it is perhaps not surprising that no progress was made at Ephesus in 193.⁵⁶ The king's envoy Minnio accused the Romans of hypocrisy, pointing out that their actions did not square with their words. He drew a parallel between the Greeks of Asia and those of Italy and Sicily, but the Roman envoy Sulpicius was able to exploit the liberation of Greece in refuting him, insisting that acceptance of Minnio's arguments would make a nonsense of Rome's treatment of Philip.

⁴⁷ Relevant items are: the liberation of Greece as a justification for the continuing presence of Roman troops (Liv. 33. 44. 9); Flamininus' case for liberating Sparta (Liv. 34. 22. 11, 32. 3 ff., 8, 13); Aetolian criticism of Flamininus' hypocrisy and repetition of the demand for total evacuation (Liv. 34. 23. 8 ff.); Flamininus' refusal to overthrow Nabis despite Greek pressure (Liv. 34. 33. 6, 9).

⁴⁸ Liv. 34. 48. 5.

⁵⁰ Liv. 34. 58 f., Diod. 28. 15, App. Syr. 6. 24.

⁵² Liv. 34. 58. 9, 59. 1.

⁵⁴ Liv. 34. 59. 5: 'qua uirtute quaque fide libertatem eorum a Philippo uindicauerit, eadem ab Antiocho, nisi decedat Europa, uindicaturum', Diod. 28. 15. 4.

⁵⁵ App. Syr. 6. 24: ἐὰν Ἀντίοχος αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔᾳ τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἀπέχηται. Cf. Badian, *Studies*, pp. 126 f. with n. 70, who rightly insists that Appian's version must be the true one. The most likely explanation of the divergence between Appian and Livy/Diodorus is perhaps that of J. P. V. D. Balsdon (*JRS* 55 (1965), 229), regrettably abandoned by him in *Phoen.* 21 (1967), 188 f., which allows 'nisi decedat Europa' to stand as Polybian while permitting Badian's arguments their full force.

⁵⁶ Liv. 35. 16. 2 ff., App. Syr. 12. 45.

⁴⁹ Liv. 34. 49. 4 ff., Diod. 28. 13.

⁵¹ Liv. 34. 58. 2 f.

⁵³ Liv. 34. 58. 11 f.

As war grew imminent, the two-edged nature of the slogan 'the freedom of the Greeks' became more apparent.⁵⁷ Then in 192 the Aetolians turned it against Rome by inviting Antiochus to liberate Greece, this time from the Romans.⁵⁸ But with Antiochus' withdrawal from Europe the Greeks of Asia naturally returned once more to the centre of the stage. At the first discussion of possible peace terms in 190 the freedom of the Greeks of Asia was exploited by Scipio for a new purpose, to provide moral justification for Rome's decision to force Antiochus to withdraw beyond the Taurus. It was not enough, he said, to free the cities of Ionia and Aeolis; all the cities of Asia must be freed, and this could allegedly be achieved only by the cession of all Asia west of the Taurus.⁵⁹

As is notorious, total Roman victory consigned the freedom of the Greeks of Asia to almost total oblivion: most of the Greeks for whom Rome had allegedly been fighting were handed over, some to Rhodes, the majority to Eumenes.⁶⁰ But before that grim but predictable conclusion the slogan still had a part to play in the dispute between Eumenes and the Rhodians at Rome.⁶¹ Eumenes warned the senate that the Rhodians would claim to be acting for the freedom of the Greeks of Asia, and would urge the Romans to show consistency, whereas their real aim would be to increase their own power at the expense of Pergamum. The Rhodians waxed eloquent along the lines forecast by the king: the liberation of the Greeks of Asia would bring great glory to the Romans, who had undertaken the war against Philip solely to set Greece proper free. The freedom of Greece was Rome's most glorious achievement: its logical consequence, the freeing of the Greeks of Asia, would now perfect her renown. Such logic had once appealed to Agesilaus and the Spartans, and it had served Rome well while Antiochus was still in the field. In the past she had sometimes allowed Greek pressure of this kind to influence her policy or, more accurately perhaps, the form in which that policy found expression. But now Rome was free to set such foolery aside, and consistency could go by the board. In the final settlement with Antiochus the freedom of the Greeks of Asia was abandoned in theory and utterly destroyed in practice. The *egregius titulus*, once it had served its purpose, was shown up as *uanus* and *speciosus* indeed.

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⁵⁷ cf. Liv. 35. 31. 8 on the squabble at Demetrias. For the frequent occurrence of the slogan during the narrative of the war in Greece, cf. Pol. 20. 8. 1, Liv. 35. 44. 6, 46. 6, 48. 8, 36. 9. 4, 11. 2. Some Greeks claimed to have no need of liberation because they were free already (Liv. 35. 46. 9 f., Plut. *Flam.* 15). Flamininus' assertion of his own claim remained consistent (Liv. 36. 34. 3 f.).

⁵⁸ Pol. 3. 7. 3, Liv. 35. 33. 8, cf. during the war 35. 46. 6, 48. 8.

⁵⁹ Pol. 21. 14. 8 f., 17, Liv. 37. 35. 9 f., App. *Syr.* 29. 143, 147.

⁶⁰ Pol. 21. 14. 8 f., 17, 24. 7, 42, 45, (cf. 25. 4 f., 27. 4. 7), Liv. 37. 55. 5 f., 38. 39 (cf. 41. 6), Diod. 29. 11, App. *Syr.* 38 f., 44. 229 ff. This despite the letter of the Scipiones to Heraclea in Latmos (*SIG*³ 618. 10 ff.). On the geographical problems, which are fortunately irrelevant here, cf. Holleaux, *Etudes* v. 208 ff., A. H. McDonald (*JRS* 57 (1967), 1 ff.). In general, cf. Holleaux, *Etudes* v. 421 ff., Bikerman (*REG* 50 (1937), 217 ff.).

⁶¹ Pol. 21. 19–23, Liv. 37. 53 f.